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INTRODUCTION: A DEBTOR’S LAMENT
Imagine that Donnie Debtor visits the hospital to receive emergency medical care. As Debtor is taken from the reception area, an
administrator hands him a clipboard and asks him to provide his contact information. Debtor quickly writes down his home address and
his cellular telephone number; he does not read the fine print on the
forms, which says that the hospital may “use and disclose health infor† New York University, B.A. Art History (2008); Rutgers University, M.A. Art History
(2011); Cornell Law School, J.D. Candidate (2015); Cornell Law Review, Online Editor;
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mation about [Debtor’s] treatment and services to bill and collect payment from [Debtor], [his] insurance company or a third party
payor.”1 A month later, Debtor gets a bill from the hospital; he does
not pay the bill. Donnie Debtor is now formally a debtor, and he
starts receiving autodialed telephone calls to his cell phone from
Third Party Collector, which has purchased the debt. A real person
does not make these calls. Instead, a computer makes them, and
when Debtor answers, he hears a prerecorded message telling him to
pay his bill. Debtor ignores the calls, which now come in unrelenting
succession—one call a day, then two, then three. Frustration soon
mounts over what Debtor views as plain harassment by a debt collector
with whom he has no prior relationship.
What options are available to Debtor? In theory, Debtor can sue
Third Party Collector under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(TCPA), which prohibits exactly the type of calls Debtor is complaining of, unless Debtor gave “prior express consent” to be called.
Because Debtor is convinced he did not give prior express consent to
be hassled by a machine, he files his claim in court. But Debtor encounters an unexpected difficulty: Third Party Collector quickly
presents to the judge a Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
declaratory ruling from 2008 that says, according to Third Party Collector, that because Debtor provided his cell phone number to hospital personnel at the time of the transaction that created the debt,
Debtor did give prior express consent to be called.
Generally, courts have been very willing to accept Third Party
Collector’s argument and to dismiss actions such as the one brought
by Debtor. And so Debtor is stuck with those automated calls, at least
until he pays off his debt. But is that the right result? Does the FCC
ruling say what Third Party Collector says it does, and—more importantly—is it consistent with the statutory language of, and intent underlying, the TCPA?
Consider another scenario: Cathy Consumer buys a television
from Retail Seller; Consumer incurs a debt to Seller by opening up a
credit account with Seller rather than paying cash for the television at
the time of sale. In connection with this transaction, Consumer fills
out a credit application, which requires that Consumer provide her
contact information, including her cellular telephone number.
Seller’s salesperson does not ask Consumer if it would be permissible
for Seller to contact Consumer at the number provided regarding the

1
This language comes from a document (“Notice of Privacy Practices”) quoted in
Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1240 n.6 (S.D. Fla. 2013), a
case discussed infra Part II.
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debt transaction.2 A few months later, when Consumer loses her job
and misses a payment, Seller initiates an autodialed call to Consumer’s wireless number to collect on the debt. Did Consumer give
prior consent to be called at that number, which she provided at the
time of sale? Unfortunately for Consumer, most courts would likely
find that, by providing her cellular telephone number, Consumer did
consent to receive calls. But did she consent expressly, or only
impliedly? And, more importantly, did she consent, either expressly or
impliedly, to be called by a computer, to answer to a prerecorded message, or instead to be called by a person who engages her in conversation? Do these distinctions even matter?
This Note explores the foregoing questions at a time when TCPA
actions are on the rise in federal courts.3 Part I of this Note provides
the background for each of the scenarios described above: the passage
of the TCPA and its purpose according to Congress; the FCC’s 2008
declaratory ruling that clarified what constitutes “prior express consent”; and some of the outcomes in federal courts since 2008. Part II
discusses a federal district court case, Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection
Bureau, Inc.,4 which questioned the validity of the FCC’s declaratory
ruling and which plaintiffs have relied upon to argue their cause of
action in other jurisdictions.5 Part III asks whether Mais (along with
several companion cases) is a mere outlier in TCPA jurisprudence or
whether it represents a much-needed corrective to an improper trend
among the lower courts.6 Part III then provides an answer from
several perspectives, concluding that although the FCC does conceiva2
For the sake of this illustration, we can assume that the application does not mention or authorize such calls.
3
See Spencer Weber Waller et al., The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Adapting Consumer Protection to Changing Technology (Loyola Univ. Chicago Sch. of Law Res. Paper,
2013) (noting a 34% rise in TCPA litigation in federal courts between 2012 and 2013).
4
944 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (S.D. Fla. 2013), reconsideration denied, No. 11-61936-Civ-RNS,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73168 (May 23, 2013), interlocutory appeal certified, 944 F. Supp. 2d
1226, 1247 (S.D. Fla. June 10, 2013).
5
See, e.g., Ranwick v. Texas Gila, LLC, No. 13-2792 (RHK/SER), 2014 WL 3891663,
at *3–4 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2014) (discussing plaintiff’s reliance on Mais for his argument
that the court could attack the validity of the 2008 FCC declaratory ruling which clarified
that agency’s interpretation of “prior express consent”); Murphy v. DCI Biologicals Orlando, LLC, No. 6:12-cv-1459-Orl-36KRS, 2013 WL 6865772, at *8 & n.11 (M.D. Fla. Dec.
31, 2013) (referring to plaintiff’s reliance on Mais and another TCPA case decided by the
same judge who decided Mais “for his proposition that express consent under the FCC
Order really constitutes implied consent”); Chavez v. Advantage Grp., 959 F. Supp. 2d
1279, 1281 (D. Colo. 2013) (“Plaintiff . . . rel[ies] on the district court’s decision in Mais v.
Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc. I am not persuaded.” (internal citation omitted)).
6
After this Note was accepted for publication, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the ruling of the district court in Mais. See infra note 113. Although unfortunate, the final disposition of the Mais case does not undermine its purpose here, which is to exemplify judicial
scrutiny of the FCC’s approach to prior express consent. Its analysis of the declaratory
ruling, although no longer “good law” on which future plaintiffs might rely, is nonetheless
valuable in highlighting some of the possible deficiencies in the FCC’s approach.
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bly have the authority to define “prior express consent,” the FCC’s
2008 ruling is not a fair or reasonable construction of the TCPA and
unduly discounts the degree to which the TCPA’s protections for consumers should extend to debtors under certain circumstances. Lastly,
the conclusion lays out the reasons why the FCC should revise its approach to prior express consent.
I
THE TCPA AND PRIOR EXPRESS CONSENT
DEBT COLLECTION CONTEXT

IN THE

In 1991, Congress enacted the TCPA to place restraints on
autodialed telemarketing and commercial solicitation calls to residential and certain other telephone lines, calls that often feature an artificial voice or prerecorded message.7 At the time, Congress viewed
such calls as an invasion of privacy and a nuisance affecting the safety
and welfare of the public.8 For example, because a telemarketing call
might tie up a landline, the sick and elderly were at risk of losing
prompt medical attention if a call placed to 9-1-1 or a hospital was
blocked by an autodialed call.9 From a privacy perspective, the
TCPA’s advocates have generally framed the law in language that underscores the sanctity of the American hearth and home: the TCPA
returned control to the American consumer, who could repose in
peace at his dinner table or watch his favorite television programming
without fear of interruption.10 To its proponents, the TCPA shielded
families nestled comfortably within their homes from peddlers of unwanted goods bent on crashing these Norman Rockwell-esque scenes
of domestic tranquility.11
As such, one cannot characterize the TCPA as primarily a debtorshielding statute (such as, for example, the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act). Rather, debt-collection calls from creditors with whom
the called party had a preexisting relationship were likely not the in7
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2,
105 Stat. 2394 (1991) (congressional findings) (codified at 47 U.S.C § 227 (2012)).
8
See id. § 2 ¶¶ 5–6, 12; see also 137 CONG. REC. 30821 (1991) (statement of Sen.
Hollings) (“Computerized calls are the scourge of modern civilization. They wake us up in
the morning; they interrupt our dinner at night; they force the sick and elderly out of bed;
they hound us until we want to rip the telephone right out of the wall. . . . It is telephone
terrorism, and it has got to stop.”).
9
See TCPA § 2 ¶ 5 (“[W]hen an emergency or medical assistance telephone line is
seized [by a telemarketing call], [it creates] a risk to public safety.”).
10
See FCC Report and Order, Rules and Regulations Implementing Tel. Consumer
Prot. Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, FCC 12-21, 27 FCC Rcd. 1830, 1849 ¶¶ 46–48
(2012) [hereinafter FCC, 2012 Report and Order] (statements of Chairman Genachowski
and Commissioners McDowell and Clyburn); TCPA § 2 ¶ 6 (“Many consumers are outraged over the proliferation of intrusive, nuisance calls to their homes from
telemarketers.”).
11
See FCC, 2012 Report and Order, supra note 10, at 46–48.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-2\CRN205.txt

2015]

unknown

HIJACKED CONSENT

Seq: 5

12-JAN-15

14:51

497

tended target of legislative action.12 Accordingly, the TCPA’s established business-relationship exemption served as a ready-made
carveout for debt-collection calls made to residential lines (prior to its
removal from the TCPA in 2012).13 In addition, the FCC, the agency
charged with promulgating rules under the TCPA, has repeatedly
stated that debt-collection calls are not commercial solicitations or
telemarketing.14 Thus, a creditor or a third party collector seeking to
collect on a debt is able to initiate an autodialed call or call using an
artificial voice or prerecorded message to a debtor’s residential line
without violating the TCPA.15
Nonetheless, virtually all calls made to wireless numbers require
the “prior express consent” of the called party—including debtcollection calls.16 The TCPA does not define prior express consent
and neither do the TCPA’s implementing regulations.17 While this
lacuna might have otherwise left the door open for courts to interpret
the prior express consent requirement according to common law
principles, this has not been the actual result, at least in the creditordebtor context.18 Instead, for debt-collection calls to wireless num12
Cf. FCC, 2012 Report and Order, supra note 10, at 4 ¶ 7 (“[T]here is no indication
that Congress intended that calls be excepted from telephone solicitation restrictions unless the residential subscriber has (a) clearly stated that the telemarketer may call, and
(b) clearly expressed an understanding that the telemarketer’s subsequent call will be
made for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property,
goods or services.” (quoting Memorandum Opinion and Order, Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CC Docket No. 92-90, 10
FCC Rcd. 12391, 12396 ¶ 11 (1995) [hereinafter FCC, 1995 Opinion and Order])); Waller
et al., supra note 3, at 17 (noting that “Congress did not intend to directly regulate debt
collection practices with the TCPA,” but that “[d]ebt collection came into the crosshairs of
the TCPA because of the industry’s use of [autodialing] technolog[y]”).
13
See Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 23
FCC Rcd. 559, 561 (2008) [hereinafter FCC, 2008 Order]. Such calls are now exempted
under 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(3)(ii)–(iii) (2013).
14
See, e.g., FCC, 2008 Order, supra note 13, at 565 (confirming that “calls solely for
the purpose of debt collection are not telephone solicitations and do not constitute
telemarketing”). The FCC has regulatory authority pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2).
15
See FCC, 2008 Order, supra note 13, at 565. This remains true despite recent
changes to the rules implementing the TCPA that require prior express written consent for
telemarketing calls made to wireless and residential lines. See infra note 136 and accompanying text. The changes became effective October 16, 2013. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200.
16
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). The TCPA only exempts from the consent requirement calls made for an emergency purpose. See id.
17
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(a); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f). The regulations now define “prior
express written consent,” however. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(8). The definition states, in
part, that a “written agreement shall include a clear and conspicuous disclosure informing
the person signing that[ ] . . . [b]y executing the agreement, such person authorizes the
seller to deliver or cause to be delivered to the signatory telemarketing calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice . . . .” Id. § 64.1200(f)(8)(i)
(emphasis added).
18
Context-specific clarifications of FCC regulations are not uncommon. See, e.g.,
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 27 FCC Rcd.
15391, 15395 (2012) [hereinafter FCC, SoundBite Ruling] (ruling that a one-time text
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bers that are made using an autodialing system or which feature a
prerecorded message, the FCC clarified its understanding of what
might constitute prior express consent in a 2008 declaratory ruling
(2008 Order), which was issued in response to a petition for clarification filed by a debt-collection trade association.19 According to the
2008 Order, “autodialed and prerecorded message calls to wireless
numbers that are provided by the called party to a creditor in connection with an existing debt are permissible as calls made with the ‘prior
express consent’ of the called party.”20 In other words, if a person
provides a creditor his or her wireless number during a transaction
that creates a debt, then—according to the FCC—that creditor has
received prior express consent to call the person using an automatic
telephone dialing system or an artificial voice or prerecorded message.21 If consent is contested, the creditor bears the burden of demonstrating that it procured the debtor’s wireless number in
connection with a debt transaction—not, however, that it procured
express verbal or written consent to call the consumer using an
autodialing system or to deliver a prerecorded message.22
Two problems stem from the 2008 Order: first, the 2008 Order
does not require that a consumer-debtor give prior express consent to
be called using an automatic telephone dialing system or prerecorded
message at all; it merely repeats language from an FCC declaratory
message sent to a consumer who had revoked consent to receive commercial text messages
confirming the consumer’s decision to opt-out did not violate the TCPA, and stating that
its interpretation of the TCPA, “in the specific circumstances at issue here, is consistent
with the goals and objectives of the TCPA”). While the definition of prior express consent
discussed in this Note is also context specific, the FCC apparently believes that it provided
a sufficient, universal definition of prior express consent—provision of the called party’s
telephone number to the caller—in a 1992 declaratory ruling. Cf. Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 7 FCC Rcd. 8752, 8769 (1992) [hereinafter FCC, 1992 Order] (noting that “persons who knowingly release their phone numbers
have in effect given their invitation or permission to be called at that number, absent instructions to the contrary”).
19
FCC, 2008 Order, supra note 13, at 559. The petition was filed by ACA International, “an international trade organization of credit and collection companies that provide a wide variety of accounts receivable management services.” Id. at 559 n.1.
20
Id. at 559.
21
Id. at 564 (“Because we find that autodialed and prerecorded message calls to wireless numbers provided by the called party in connection with an existing debt are made
with the ‘prior express consent’ of the called party, we clarify that such calls are permissible.” (footnote omitted)).
22
See id. at 564–65 (“To ensure that creditors and debt collectors call only those consumers who have consented to receive autodialed and prerecorded message calls, we conclude that the creditor should be responsible for demonstrating that the consumer
provided prior express consent.”). Consent is an affirmative defense. See Conklin v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 6:13-cv-1246-Orl-37KRS, 2013 WL 6409731, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 9,
2013) (“As Plaintiff has pled that he did not give consent or alternatively revoked consent,
he has adequately stated a TCPA claim, and [the defendant loan servicer’s] motion [to
dismiss] is due to be denied on that ground. It will be Defendant’s task to prove consent at
the summary-judgment stage.” (citation omitted)).
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ruling from 1992 stating that persons who give out their telephone
numbers “have in effect given their invitation or permission to be
called at the number which they have given, absent instructions to the
contrary.”23 The 2008 Order completely disregards how the call is
made or whether the called party hears a prerecorded message upon
answering despite the fact that the TCPA is very much concerned with
what type of call is being made.24 Perhaps aware of this, the FCC tried
to bolster its approach by pointing to legislative intent, specifically a
House of Representatives report noting that the TCPA’s restrictions
do not apply to calls made to numbers provided to the caller by the
called party “for use in normal business communications.”25 But section 227(b)(1)(A)—the provision dealing with calls to wireless numbers—does not contain a business-relationship exemption, so the
House report is not on point.
The second problem stemming from the 2008 Order is that the
FCC’s approach to prior express consent in the debt-collection context hardly looks like prior express consent at all. Rather, the FCC has
stated that “the provision of a cell phone number to a creditor, e.g., as
part of a credit application, reasonably evidences prior express consent by
the cell phone subscriber to be contacted at that number regarding
the debt.”26 But express consent is, well, express; there is no reason
why it should have to be inferred from—or “reasonably evidence[d]”
by—the circumstances.27 Thus, the ultimate question is whether, by
allowing prior consent to be reasonably evidenced by the actions of
the debtor, the FCC has grafted an implied consent exemption onto
section 227(b)(1)(A).28
23

FCC, 2008 Order, supra note 13, at 564 (quoting FCC, 1992 Order, supra note 18, at

R

8769).
24
For example, section 227(b) of the TCPA imposes no restrictions on person-toperson calls made for debt collection purposes. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (2012); see also
Gager v. Dell Fin. Servs., LLC, 727 F.3d 265, 274 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that defendant’s
argument failed to make note of the fact that “creditors are permitted to attempt live,
person-to-person calls in order to collect a debt”).
25
FCC, 2008 Order, supra note 13, at 564 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 17
(1991)); see also GroupMe, Inc./Skye Communications S.A.R.L. Petition for Declaratory
Ruling, FCC 14-33, No. 02-278, at 3 ¶ 8 (Mar. 27, 2014) [hereinafter FCC, GroupMe Ruling] (“Congress did not expect the TCPA to be a barrier to normal, expected, and desired
business communications.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 17)).
26
FCC, 2008 Order, supra note 13, at 564 (emphasis added).
27
See id.; infra text accompanying note 161. For example, if a father tells his daughter, “I consent to you marrying Tom,” one would usually not say that his consent was
predominantly inferred from the circumstances (his appearance, the tone of his voice, or
any gestures accompanying his speech). Rather, his grant of consent is directly communicated by his words; it is express. Any inference that might follow from the circumstances is
merely additional information that supports (or contradicts) an express declaration. If the
father says nothing but all in attendance know from his gestures, facial expression, or lack
of contradictory action that he has consented, then that consent is implied; it is not express.
28
Cf. Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1239 (S.D. Fla.
2013) (noting that “the FCC is not talking about ‘express consent,’ but is instead engraft-
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Despite these concerns, courts have generally accepted arguments from creditors and debt collectors who contend that the 2008
Order virtually exempts them from the TCPA’s coverage. Chavez v.
Advantage Group provides an illustration of this line of cases.29 The
facts of Chavez are straightforward: Charlene Chavez visited Parkview
Medical Center for the purpose of receiving medical services.30 At
that time, she provided Parkview with her cellular telephone number.31 Chavez then incurred a debt and failed to pay her bill when it
came due; Parkview assigned the debt to a third party (Advantage
Group) for collection.32 Advantage Group proceeded to call Chavez
using an autodialing system, which Chavez argued was a violation of
the TCPA because she never gave prior express consent to be called in
such a manner.33 Advantage Group moved for summary judgment on
Chavez’s TCPA claim; the court, concluding that “[Chavez] expressly
consented to be contacted” by Advantage, granted the motion in Advantage’s favor.34 In reaching its decision, the court cited the 2008
Order and stated that providing a wireless number to a creditor constitutes prior express consent.35 The court then rejected, without
analysis, Chavez’s argument that, contrary to what is suggested by the
ing into the statute an additional exception for ‘implied consent’—one that Congress did
not include”); Thrasher-Lyon v. CCS Commercial, LLC, No. 11 C 04473, 2012 WL
3835089, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2012) (“Bizarre would be to read ‘express consent’ as
‘implied consent.’ In ordinary parlance, there is no such thing as ‘implied express consent’—that is an oxymoron.”).
29
959 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Colo. 2013). As a list of all relevant TCPA cases would be
exceedingly long and ever expanding, the following provide a helpful starting point:
O’Connor v. Diversified Consultants, Inc., No 4:11CV1722 RWS, 2013 WL 2319342, at *4–5
(E.D. Mo. May 28, 2013); Jamison v. First Credit Servs., Inc., 290 F.R.D. 92, 99–101 (N.D.
Ill. 2013); Adamcik v. Credit Control Servs., Inc., 832 F. Supp. 2d 744, 753 (W.D. Tex.
2011); Bates v. I.C. Sys., Inc., No. 09-CV-103A, 2009 WL 3459740, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 19,
2009). See also Roy v. Dell Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 3:13-CV-738, 2013 WL 3678551, at *3 (M.D.
Pa. July 12, 2013) (concluding that the TCPA does not apply at all to calls made for debtcollection purposes, but failing to distinguish between calls made to residential lines and
calls made to wireless numbers).
30
See Chavez, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 1280. That the transaction that created the debt was
not a commercial transaction raises an entirely different question, which is whether the
FCC meant for its 2008 Order to apply to debt transactions related to the provision of
medical services. The Mais court argued, in the alternative, that even if the 2008 Order is
entitled to Chevron deference, see infra notes 163–64 and accompanying text, nonetheless it
does not apply to debts arising from medical care, see Mais, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 1239. This
Note does not answer this question, except to suggest that application of the 2008 Order to
such contexts further erodes the FCC’s justifications for adopting such a permissible standard for consent.
31
Chavez, 959 F. Supp. 2d, at 1280.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 1280–81.
34
Id. at 1279–83. As is often the case, Chavez also involved a Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act claim, which was not relevant to the TCPA claim or discussed in the opinion.
See id. at 1280 n.2.
35
Id. at 1281.
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2008 Order, she did not expressly consent because she did not give
Advantage Group permission to call her using an autodialing system.36
The court considered itself bound by the 2008 Order and without jurisdiction to review it and therefore unable to look to the merits of the
2008 Order or determine whether the FCC’s standard for prior express consent was appropriate as applied to the plaintiff’s case.37 Despite the likelihood of a question of material fact whether Chavez had
actually given her prior express consent, the court, in ruling on the
summary judgment motion, accepted Advantage’s argument that, because Chavez had provided her number to Parkview, Advantage had
thereby obtained her prior express consent to call her using an
autodialing system.38
The Chavez court considered itself obligated to follow the FCC’s
2008 Order on account of a jurisdictional issue: the federal courts of
appeals have “exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in
whole or in part), or to determine the validity of—all final orders of the
[FCC] made reviewable by § 402(a) of [the Hobbs Act].”39 Section
402(a) of the Hobbs Act in turn dictates that “[a]ny proceeding to
enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend any order of the [FCC] . . . shall
be brought as provided by and in the manner prescribed in chapter
158 of title 28.”40 Thus, the federal district courts have no jurisdictional authority to decide TCPA claims without treating the FCC’s
2008 Order as binding law.41 Therefore, because disregarding the
2008 Order would rob a federal district court of subject-matter
jurisdiction as to a TCPA claim, most courts have accepted the validity
of the 2008 Order without engaging with it on the merits.42
36

See id. at 1280–81.
See id. at 1282.
38
See id. at 1283.
39
Id. at 1282 (emphasis added) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40
47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (2012).
41
See, e.g., Chavez, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 1282 (“Regardless of how the claim is brought
before the court, the practical effect of accepting plaintiff’s argument here [that, contrary
to the 2008 Order, she did not provide prior express consent] would be to set aside, annul,
or suspend the 2008 FCC Ruling. I am without jurisdiction to effectuate that outcome.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Thrasher-Lyon v. CCS Commercial, LLC, No. 11 C
04473, 2012 WL 3835089, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2012) (“The FCC’s creditor rule, which
goes beyond the plain language of the TCPA to mitigate a burden on creditors that was
likely not intended by the statute, is binding on this Court . . . .”).
42
See, e.g., Kolinek v. Walgreen Co., No. 13 C 4806, 2014 WL 3056813, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
July 7, 2014) (noting, in the course of ruling on plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, that
the court had previously dismissed the plaintiff’s TCPA action on the grounds that “the
[FCC’s] interpretation of the prior express consent defense is binding on federal district
courts, including this one”—but nonetheless vacating its earlier opinion upon a finding
that the plaintiff had not consented to receive the type of calls at issue); Murphy v. DCI
Biologicals Orlando, LLC, No. 6:12-cv-1459-Orl-36KRS, 2013 WL 6865772, at *23 (M.D.
Fla. Dec. 31, 2013) (“[I]f the [c]ourt determines the Hobbs Act to be applicable to this
case, the [c]ourt is bound to apply the definition of ‘express consent’ from the 1992 FCC
37
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Some courts, however, have reached the merits of the 2008 Order
and have considered it either problematic or unworthy of judicial deference.43 A few of these cases are discussed in the next section, with
particular focus on one, Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc., which
represents the most systematic attack of the 2008 Order to date.
II
JUDICIAL CHALLENGES TO THE FCC’S INTERPRETATION
PRIOR EXPRESS CONSENT

OF

A. Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc.
The facts and procedural posture of Mais were as follows: the
plaintiff was admitted to the hospital for medical treatment, and his
wife gave his cell phone number to hospital personnel on a form that
authorized the hospital to release the plaintiff’s “healthcare information” for payment purposes.44 The plaintiff then incurred a debt for
his medical treatment, which he did not pay.45 The debt was forwarded, along with the plaintiff’s cell phone number, along a chain of
entities until it eventually ended up in the hands of Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc. (Gulf Coast), for collection purposes, pursuant to a
written agreement between the holding company of the radiology
provider that had treated the plaintiff (a separate entity from the hospital) and Gulf Coast, a third party collector.46 After Gulf Coast attempted to contact the plaintiff about the debt using an automatic
telephone dialing system, the plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit
against Gulf Coast and a number of related entities in the Federal
District Court for the Southern District of Florida.47 The defendants
then moved collectively for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s
TCPA claim, arguing that the wife’s provision of the plaintiff’s cell
phone number to the hospital constituted prior express consent in

Order to this matter.”); Chavez, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 1282 (“I therefore join with those courts
that have found that the 2008 FCC Ruling is binding on the district courts and not subject
to review except by the federal courts of appeals.”).
43
See infra Part II.
44
944 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1230–31 (S.D. Fla. 2013).
45
See id. at 1231.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 1230–33.
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accordance with the FCC’s 2008 Order.48 The district court denied
the motion on several grounds.49
The court rejected the argument that the plaintiff had given
prior express consent to be called by Gulf Coast at his wireless number.50 In reaching that conclusion, the court determined that the
FCC’s 2008 Order was not entitled to Chevron deference because its
interpretation of prior express consent contradicted the plain language of the statute.51 Prior to reaching the Chevron analysis, however, the court had to surmount the jurisdictional hurdle presented by
the Hobbs Act: was this an action to “enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend any order of the [FCC]”?52 Engaging in plain language statutory
analysis, the court concluded first that the 2008 Order “pertain[ed] to
the Defendants’ affirmative defense of consent, [and] not to any element of [the] Plaintiff’s claims”;53 and second that the plaintiff was
not seeking “to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend” the order,54 or
even claiming that it was incorrect. “Instead, [the plaintiff’s] position
[was] that the 2008 FCC Ruling does not apply on these facts.”55
Finding jurisdictional competence, the court then proceeded to
its Chevron analysis to determine whether the 2008 Order was entitled
to deference.56 First, the court asked “whether Congress ha[d] di48
Id. at 1234. The defendants also argued that, “because they had consent to use and
disclose Plaintiff’s phone number under HIPAA [the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act], they also had consent to call him under the TCPA.” Id. The defendants’
argument proves too much: it demonstrates that, despite the written agreement being both
intended for and drafted in consideration of purposes related to HIPAA, not the TCPA,
the creditors felt justified in relying on the agreement for purposes of the TCPA (because
through it they acquired the debtor’s wireless number). See id. But it seems beyond reason
to argue that a person expressly consents to calls from an autodialing system when he or
she signs a form that merely grants the recipient of the signatory’s wireless number the
right to use that number for HIPAA purposes.
49
Id. at 1241.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 1238–39. For a discussion of Chevron deference, see infra notes 163–64 and
accompanying text.
52
Id. at 1235–38 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
53
Id. at 1235.
54
Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
55
Id. The court, in the course of its analysis of the Hobbs Act, stated the following:
The takeaway . . . is this: if a plaintiff’s claims ‘necessarily conflict with final
orders of the FCC and thereby depend on the district court being able to
collaterally review the correctness or validity of those orders,’ then the
Hobbs Act deprives the district court of jurisdiction. That is not the case
here. Plaintiff’s claims do not necessarily hinge on invalidation of the 2008
FCC Ruling and Plaintiff does not even argue that it is invalid. . . . Therefore, the court of appeals does not have jurisdiction; this
Court does.
Id. at 1236–37 (citations omitted) (quoting Self v. Bellsouth Mobility, Inc., 700 F.3d 453,
462 (11th Cir. 2012)).
56
Id. at 1238.
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rectly spoken on the matter at issue” and, if so, whether its intent was
clear.57 The court then found that Congress had spoken directly on
the matter when it explicitly stated that autodialed calls could not be
made without “the prior express consent of the called party.”58 Accordingly, the court next looked to “the common usage of those
words [‘prior express consent’] to discern their meaning.”59 It referred to Black’s Law Dictionary, which “defines ‘express consent’ as
‘[c]onsent that is clearly and unmistakably stated.’”60 With this definition in hand, as well as the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of implied
consent,61 the Mais court then concluded that the FCC’s 2008 Order
was inconsistent with the statute’s plain language and therefore not
worthy of judicial deference:
It should be clear from [the FCC’s interpretation of prior express
consent] . . . that the FCC is not talking about “express consent,”
but is instead engrafting into the statute an additional exception for
“implied consent”—one that Congress did not include. Although it
may be reasonable to presume that an individual, in providing a cell
phone number on a credit application, consents to be called at that
number by the creditor, such consent is “implied” through the individual’s conduct—that is, his act of writing down his number on the
application. He has not directly, clearly, and unmistakably stated
that the creditor may call him, and so he has not given “express
consent.”62

Accordingly, the Mais court rejected the defendants’ affirmative
defense of consent because it found that the plaintiff had not expressly consented to be called by means of an automatic telephone
dialing system.63 The court also refused to enforce implied consent
from the plaintiff’s wife’s provision of the plaintiff’s cell phone
number to hospital personnel.64 In the alternative, however, the
57
Id.; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842–43 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.”).
58
Mais, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 1238 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 47 U.S.C
§ 227(b)(1)(A)).
59
Id.
60
Id. (citing and quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 356 (9th ed. 2009)); see also
Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 955 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Express consent is
[c]onsent that is clearly and unmistakably stated.” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 323
(8th ed. 2004) (internal quotation .marks omitted)).
61
See Mais, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 1238. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “implied consent”
as “[c]onsent inferred from one’s conduct rather than from one’s direct expression.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 346 (9th ed. 2009).
62
Mais, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 1239.
63
See id.
64
See id. Cf. Lusskin v. Seminole Comedy, Inc., No. 12-62173-Civ-SCOLA, 2013 WL
3147339, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 19, 2013) (“It might be reasonable to infer that a person who
gives his or her cell number to another party has consented to later be contacted, by that
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court also concluded that the 2008 Order did not apply in the medical
care setting, and that, even if it did apply, plaintiff had not given his
“consent[ ] to be called by the relevant creditor.”65 Therefore, the
plaintiff escaped adverse summary judgment on the issue of whether
he had given prior express consent to be called by means of an automatic telephone dialing system.66
B. Edeh and Thrasher-Lyon
Before proceeding to the analysis of the Mais decision, it is worth
considering two other cases that addressed the FCC’s interpretation of
prior express consent: Edeh v. Midland Credit Management, Inc.67 and
Thrasher-Lyon v. CCS Commercial, LLC.68 These cases highlight the nuances present in an otherwise straightforward dispute over statutory
interpretation.
Edeh involved a plaintiff who defaulted on a credit card; a third
party collector then placed one autodialed call to the plaintiff’s cellular telephone, seeking to collect the debt.69 Following subsequent
communications between plaintiff and the creditor, the plaintiff filed
various claims, including a TCPA claim arising from the autodialed
call made to his cell phone.70 The collector, on motion for summary
judgment, argued that it had received the plaintiff’s prior express consent when it received his cellular telephone number at the time it purchased the debt from the original creditor (the issuer of the card).71
The court quickly rejected the creditor’s argument, relying on the
statutory language of the TCPA: “Midland’s call to Edeh’s cellular
phone was permissible only if it was made ‘with [Edeh’s] prior express
consent.’”72 According to the court, express consent must be explicit,
not implicit, and is not given unless the consumer-debtor says
(verbally or in writing) to either the collector or the collector’s predecessor in interest (i.e., the original creditor) “something like this: ‘I
give you permission to use an automatic telephone dialing system to
party, at that number through an automatic-dialing-system. But this is just an inference
(i.e., a conclusion reached by considering the circumstances and deducing a logical consequence from a person’s conduct). Because this conclusion must be inferred from conduct,
that necessarily means that permission was not directly stated (i.e., it was not expressed).”).
65
Mais, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 1239–41. See also FCC, 2008 Order, supra note 13, at 565
n.38 (explaining that “prior express consent provided to a particular creditor will not entitle that creditor (or third party collector) to call a consumer’s wireless number on behalf
of other creditors, including on behalf of affiliated entities”).
66
Mais, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 1246.
67
748 F. Supp. 2d 1030 (D. Minn. 2010).
68
No. 11 C 04473, 2012 WL 3835089 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2012).
69
Edeh, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1033–34.
70
See id. at 1034, 1038.
71
Id. at 1038.
72
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2012)).

R
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call my cellular phone.’”73 The Edeh court thereby enunciated a
heightened “magic words” standard for consent, requiring not only
that a creditor obtain a consumer-debtor’s cellular telephone number
at the time of a credit transaction (or from a predecessor in interest
who obtained it in like circumstances), but also that the creditor actually obtain consent to use that number to place autodialed calls or
calls delivering a prerecorded message.74
Thrasher-Lyon involved a plaintiff who collided with an automobile
while riding her bicycle.75 She provided her contact information, including her wireless number, to the car’s driver and the responding
police officer.76 The driver’s insurance company subsequently contacted the plaintiff by phone and letter, seeking to collect the money
it had paid to the driver pursuant to the driver’s insurance claim.77
When the plaintiff failed to respond, the insurance company sold the
debt to a third party collector.78 The third party collector then placed
at least one autodialed call to the plaintiff’s wireless number, and the
plaintiff filed a TCPA claim.79 In response to the claim, the
defendant-collector averred that the plaintiff had given prior express
consent to be contacted regarding the debt because she had voluntarily given her wireless number to the driver and police officer at the
time of the accident and, when contacted at that number by the insurance company, had confirmed that it was a valid contact number.80
The court, finding that the plaintiff had not given express consent to
be contacted by the insurance company or the collector through an
autodialing system, denied the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment.81
The Thrasher-Lyon opinion adds two key elements to a critical
analysis of the FCC’s 2008 Order. First, the court uncovered, perhaps
inadvertently, what may be a common practice among third party collectors: the defendant-collector admitted to the court that, at the time
it purchased the debt from the insurance company, it did not “take
any steps to investigate or verify whether express consent [to be called
73

Id.
See id.; cf. Thrasher-Lyon, 2012 WL 3835089, at *5 (“‘Express’ connotes a requirement of specificity, not ‘general unrestricted permission’ inferred from the act of giving
out a number . . . .”); FCC, 2008 Order, supra note 13, at 565 n.37 (encouraging creditors
“to include language on credit applications and other documents informing the consumer
that, by providing a wireless telephone number, the consumer consents to receiving
autodialed and prerecorded message calls . . . at that number”).
75
2012 WL 3835089, at *1.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at *6.
74

R
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using an autodialing system] was given.”82 Rather, the collector
merely relied on the fact that the plaintiff had provided her wireless
number to the original creditor, the insurance company.83 In light of
the fact that many of these TCPA cases involve third party collectors
who have no direct contact with their debtors before placing autodialed calls,84 the FCC’s standard for prior express consent, when put
into practice, may therefore permit creditors to rely on a form of consent that is so attenuated and hypothesized as to be almost a myth.85
This outcome, if supported by the evidence, contravenes the purpose
of the TCPA because that statute requires prior express consent for all
nonemergency calls made to wireless numbers using an autodialing
system—not merely for those calls that are not placed to debtors.86
Congress is free to write such a differential treatment into the statute;
the FCC is not.87
Second, the Thrasher-Lyon court carefully emphasized a point
which complements the one made above (as well as the argument
made by the Edeh court): the TCPA prohibits only those calls made to
wireless numbers that are made without prior express consent and
that either were initiated by an autodialing system or deliver a
prerecorded voice or message.88 Therefore, the question raised by a
creditor’s assertion that the called party gave consent will necessarily
be this: to what did the debtor give consent?89 In Thrasher-Lyon, the
creditor argued that a debtor “need only give general unrestricted
permission and consent to be called at the subject number.”90 Rejecting this argument, the court correctly noted that the TCPA remedies a specific wrong—namely, unsolicited autodialed calls or calls
delivering a prerecorded message—and that the consent required by
82
See id. at *1 n.2 (noting in addition that, while the defendant denied assuming
consent, the court did “not discern any material distinction between [defendant’s] admitted practice and ‘simply assuming’ consent”).
83
See id. at *4.
84
See, e.g., Levy v. Receivables Performance Mgmt., LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 409, 413
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that the debt collector autodialed debtor’s cellular telephone after purchasing the telephone number from debtor’s credit agency); Thrasher-Lyon, 2012
WL 3835089, at *1.
85
Cf. Zyburo v. NCSPlus, Inc., No. 12-CV-6677, 2014 WL 4536932, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 15, 2014) (in the course of ruling on a motion for class certification in a TCPA class
action, noting that the defendant collection agency “has no policies or procedures for
determining whether . . . the recipients of its autodialed calls have provided prior express
consent to receive such calls” and “by its own admission[ ] . . . keeps poor or nonexistent
records of which class members have given consent to the underlying creditor”).
86
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1) (2012).
87
Cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).
88
See Thrasher-Lyon, 2012 WL 3835089, at *1–3.
89
Id. at *2 (“The question requiring interpretation is: ‘consent to what?’”).
90
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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section 227(b)(1)(A) must necessarily be consent to be called using
those technologies; “otherwise,” the court added, “the statute would exempt a broader class of calls than it bans in the first place.”91 Accordingly, when reviewing the FCC’s interpretation of prior express
consent in the debt-collection context, it is important to determine
whether that interpretation narrows the scope of consent that can be
inferred from provision of a wireless number—because the FCC’s interpretation clearly allows for an inference of consent92—from general consent to consent to receive autodialed calls. If it does not, then
it is overinclusive of the types of calls it exempts from the TCPA’s
prohibitions.93

IS

THE

III
FCC’S INTERPRETATION ENTITLED
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE?

TO

This Part has three subparts: Subpart A addresses the Mais decision and significant counterarguments to its repudiation of the FCC’s
2008 Order. Subpart B discusses whether, in light of the purpose and
function of the TCPA, the normative approach found in Mais and
other, similar decisions is compelling enough to override the FCC’s
judgment in crafting its standard for prior express consent in the
debt-collection context. Subpart C considers whether Congress
granted the FCC discretion to craft an expansive definition of prior
express consent and whether the FCC’s approach represents a permissible construction of the statute.
A. Do Judicial Errors Undermine the Mais Court’s Analysis?
This subpart discusses and responds to several possible counterarguments to the Mais court’s repudiation of the 2008 Order, focusing in particular on legal or procedural criticisms. District courts both
within and outside of the Eleventh Circuit have already criticized and
refused to follow the Mais court’s analysis, mainly on procedural
grounds.94 This subpart argues that, although the Mais court under91
Id. at *2. But see Ranwick v. Texas Gila, LLC, No. 13-2792, 2014 WL 3891663, at *4
(D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2014) (accepting “[t]he thrust of the FCC’s [1992 and 2008 Orders,]
[which] is that a person need not specifically consent to be contacted using an autodialer
or artificial or prerecorded voice”).
92
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
93
Cf. Leckler v. Cashcall, Inc. (Leckler I), 554 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
(rejecting the argument that Congress intended the phrase “prior express consent” to “apply merely to the act of calling,” and suggesting that if the exemption applied whenever a
called party gave general consent to be called, “without any consideration given to the
method or type of call, the exemption would be contrary to the logic of the statute”).
94
See, e.g., Ranwick, 2014 WL 3891663, at *4 (“[T]he Court declines to follow Mais
and will defer to the FCC’s interpretation of ‘prior express consent’ rather than opine on
its validity.”); Murphy v. DCI Biologicals Orlando, LLC, No. 6:12-cv-1459-Orl-36KRS, 2013
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mined its own analysis by operating beyond the jurisdictional bounds
imposed by the Hobbs Act, the opinion nonetheless raises a valid objection to the FCC’s interpretation of prior express consent and suggests that the FCC’s approach is unreasonable in light of plain
statutory language.
The first counterargument to the Mais court’s treatment of the
2008 Order is that, based on the facts of the case, there was no reason
why the court needed to repudiate the 2008 Order in order to deny
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.95 First, the plaintiff
in Mais did not give his cell phone number to the hospital; his wife
did.96 Second, the hospital was not even the creditor with whom the
plaintiff ultimately transacted.97 Therefore, there was an argument to
be made—and in fact the plaintiff made the argument—that, on its
face, the FCC’s 2008 Order was inapplicable to the facts of the case.98
Accordingly, the court should have simply denied the motion for summary judgment because, if anyone gave prior express consent, it was
the plaintiff’s wife,99 who presumably had an entirely different wireless
number. The question of whether one may give prior express consent
on behalf of a third person is not addressed in the FCC’s 2008 Order;
however, other courts have suggested that only the primary user of the
phone may give consent.100 Third, the FCC’s exemption applies only
WL 6865772, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 31, 2013) (“[T]his Court agrees with the Chavez court
[that Mais is an outlier] and joins those courts that have found that the 2008 FCC Ruling is
binding on the district courts and not subject to review except by the federal courts of
appeals.”); Chavez v. Advantage Grp., 959 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1281 (D. Colo. 2013) (finding
the Mais court’s analysis “legally insupportable”). But see Zyburo v. NCSPlus, Inc., No. 12CV-6677, 2014 WL 4536932, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2014) (“[T]his Court agrees with the
Mais Court that ‘[t]he FCC’s construction is inconsistent with the statute’s plain language
because it impermissibly amends the TCPA to provide an exception for [implied consent] . . . .’” (quoting Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 2d 1226,
1239 (S.D. Fla. 2013)).
95
In fact, the court itself seems to have admitted this. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
96
Mais, 944 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1230–31.
97
The plaintiff’s wife provided his cellular telephone number to hospital personnel;
however, as the court notes, plaintiff incurred a debt with Florida United Radiology, L.C.,
“a hospital-based provider that performs clinical services on behalf of hospital facilities”
but which was a separate legal entity from the hospital. Id. It seems unlikely that Congress
intended for consumers to have to disentangle the intricacies of an agency relationship in
order to determine to whom consent should properly be given: consent should be available only to the creditor to whom the number was given (or a collector acting on the creditor’s behalf) who uses the number to contact the consumer regarding the debt. Cf. FCC,
2008 Order, supra note 13, at 565 n.38 (“[P]rior express consent provided to a particular
creditor will not entitle that creditor . . . to call a consumer’s wireless number on behalf of
other creditors, including on behalf of affiliated entities.”).
98
See Mais, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 1235 (“[Plaintiff’s] position is that the 2008 FCC Ruling
does not apply on these facts.”).
99
See id. at 1230–31.
100
See, e.g., Soppet v. Enhanced Recovery Co., 679 F.3d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that “[c]onsent to call a given number must come from its current subscriber”); Cellco

R
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to autodialed calls made to numbers provided by the called party to a
creditor of the called party.101 Again, the called party in Mais was not
the person who provided the wireless number, nor was the number
given to the creditor who ultimately relied upon that consent.102
Therefore, either a genuine question of material fact existed whether
the plaintiff had authorized his wife to give consent on his behalf,
making a summary judgment ruling on the issue of consent inappropriate, or there was simply no consent at all, as a matter of law,
because—read narrowly—both the TCPA and the 2008 Order suggest
that consent must come directly from the called party.103 If the court
had taken either of these two approaches, it would have reached the
same outcome (denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment)
and could have avoided upending the 2008 Order.
Unfortunately, the record does not disclose whether the plaintiff
in Mais authorized his wife to give consent on his behalf; accordingly
it is difficult to assess the strength of this counterargument.104 But
this line of inquiry does raise another concern regarding the 2008
P’ship v. Plaza Resorts Inc., No. 12-81238-CIV, 2013 WL 5436553, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 27,
2013) (“The Court starts with the proposition that the subscriber controls the telephone
for all legally relevant purposes, since the subscriber is the person who is obligated to pay
for the telephone and has the authority to consent to receive calls that would otherwise be prohibited
by the statute. . . . The primary user of the telephone is the one who needs protection from
nuisance calls and invasions of privacy, not a subscriber who never uses the telephone.”
(emphasis added)). The FCC’s 2008 Order applies to automated calls made to wireless
numbers “that are provided by the called party to a creditor in connection with an existing
debt.” FCC, 2008 Order, supra note 13, at 559 (emphasis added). In March 2014, however, the FCC issued a declaratory ruling which suggests that, in certain circumstances,
consent to be called using an autodialing system “may be obtained through and conveyed
by an intermediary.” See FCC, GroupMe Ruling, supra note 25, at 3 ¶ 6. The future impact
of the GroupMe Ruling on debt collection cases (including the applicability of the
consent-by-intermediary rule to debt-collection calls) remains to be seen and, unfortunately, cannot be fully analyzed in this Note.
101
See FCC, 2008 Order, supra note 13, at 564–65 (“[P]rior express consent is deemed
to be granted only if the wireless number was provided by the consumer to the creditor,
and that such number was provided during the transaction that resulted in the debt
owed.”); see also supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
102
See Mais, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 1230–31, 1241. To suggest that in the medical care
context, under the unique circumstance where a person needing medical attention has a
spouse or guardian fill out paperwork on his or her behalf, the spouse or guardian has
thereby provided consent for autodialed calls from a third party is to go far beyond the
language of either the TCPA or the FCC’s 2008 Order. Cf. FCC, 2008 Order, supra note
13, at 564–65.
103
This would perhaps be a very narrow reading of the 2008 Order, but it could hardly
be called “setting aside” or “determining the validity of” the order. Cf. FCC, 2008 Order,
supra note 13, at 564–65. But see FCC, GroupMe Ruling, supra note 25, at 3 ¶ 6 (“[A]
consumer’s prior express consent may be obtained through and conveyed by an
intermediary . . . .”).
104
The court noted merely the following: “[T]he [c]ourt alternatively finds that Defendants have failed to show Plaintiff consented to be called by the relevant creditor.
Plaintiff’s wife provided his phone number to the admissions clerk when Plaintiff was admitted to the Hospital.” Mais, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 1241.
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Order: that defendants are using the 2008 Order as a shield in situations where its justifications are arguably at their weakest. Here, the
record suggests that the plaintiff—the called party—was literally and
figuratively not in a position to give the type of consent that would
justify removing him from the statute’s protections.105 Consent, if
any, was very attenuated.106 This fact, matched with the relatively low
burden that the FCC’s interpretation of prior express consent places
on vendors and creditors,107 suggests that the 2008 Order, if left binding on the lower courts, will effectively “declaw” section 227(b)(1)(A)
of the Act, at least in certain circumstances. Of course, maintaining
the effectiveness of laws over time and carrying out their purpose may
require flexibility in their application. However, flexibility does not
mean that the operation of a statute is so affected as to remove protections from the class of persons the statute is intended to protect. Put
simply, the FCC does not have clear statutory authority to “declaw”
section 227(b)(1)(A) in this manner.108
A second counterargument to the Mais decision is that the Mais
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the validity of the
2008 Order because of the Hobbs Act.109 This argument is more than
just academic: a short time after issuing its initial order, the Mais court
certified controlling questions of law to the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals.110 The appellate court will have to address the jurisdictional
issue, in part because one of the questions certified was “[w]hether a
district court has jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act to review an FCC
order in a TCPA case when the plaintiff does not challenge the
validity of that order.”111 There are at least two possible outcomes.
On the one hand, the appellate court could endorse the lower court’s
assertion that, because the plaintiff was not contesting the validity of
the 2008 Order (merely its application to the case), the court was not
105
See id. at 1230 (“Because Plaintiff was ill, his wife . . . interacted with the Hospital
admissions staff on his behalf.”).
106
The defendants appear to have made the argument that the plaintiff’s consent
could be inferred from the conduct of his wife. See id. at 1248 (noting that the defendant
Gulf Coast “was asking the [c]ourt to imply consent from Plaintiff’s wife’s conduct”).
107
See supra notes 23, 26–28 and accompanying text.
108
See infra Part III.C.
109
See, e.g., Chavez v. Advantage Grp., 959 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1282–83 (D. Colo. 2013)
(“The Mais court went to great—indeed, one might say extreme—lengths to narrowly define [47 U.S.C. § 402(a)’s] jurisdictional provision. . . . I am not inclined to engage in the
semantical machinations which allowed the Mais court to bypass the jurisdictional boundary established by Congress.”).
110
Mais, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 1253. One of the questions certified was “whether the
FCC’s pronouncement[ ] on the issue[ ] of ‘prior express consent’ . . . [is] entitled to
deference under Chevron.” Id.
111
Id. Both the Mais opinion and subsequent order noted that there was “no Eleventh
Circuit decision directly addressing whether the Hobbs Act bars review [of an FCC order]
in this context.” Id. at 1236, 1249.
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“setting aside” or “enjoining” the 2008 Order and was therefore not
robbed of jurisdiction by the Hobbs Act;112 the appellate court might
then address the merits of the 2008 Order or affirm the ruling on
other grounds (such as failure of consent by proxy). If, on the other
hand, the appellate court rejects the district court’s exercise of subject
matter jurisdiction, it will likely reverse the summary judgment ruling
and remand the case with instructions binding on the district court
judge.113
However, even if the lower court’s ruling is vacated, confusion
among the district courts will likely continue, at least until the issue is
resolved at a higher level. Mais is, as the saying goes, “déjà vu all over
again”: in Leckler v. Cashcall, Inc., a case in 2008, a district court similarly found the FCC’s 2008 Order “‘manifestly contrary to [the
TCPA]’ and unreasonable” using the same sort of plain language analysis found in Mais.114 Accordingly, the Leckler court denied the
defendant-creditor’s motion for partial summary judgment, finding
that the plaintiff had not given prior express consent to be called by
means of an autodialing system even though she had provided her
wireless number to the defendant on a loan application—the very archetype of consent envisioned by the FCC Order.115 The defendant
ultimately moved to vacate the order; the court then granted the motion and dismissed the case, finding that, because the 2008 Order was
a “final order” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2342,116 the district
court lacked jurisdictional authority to review it, and its judgment was
therefore void.117
The Leckler court was clearly not aware of the requirements of the
Hobbs Act until after it had issued the initial order; neither the plaintiff nor the defendant appear to have brought it to the court’s attention in their initial filings.118 But, importantly, the court never
112

See id. at 1236–37.
After this Note was accepted for publication, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
district court had exceeded its jurisdiction “[b]y refusing to enforce the FCC’s interpretation.” Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc., No. 13-14008, 2014 WL 4802457, at *7
(11th Cir. Sept. 29, 2014). It then remanded the case with instructions to the lower court
to enter summary judgment in favor of Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc. See id. at *1.
114
Leckler v. Cashcall, Inc. (Leckler I), 554 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
(quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
115
Id. at 1033–34; see also FCC, 2008 Order, supra note 13, at 564 (concluding that
“provision of a cell phone number to a creditor, e.g., as part of a credit application,” constituted prior express consent).
116
28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) establishes that the federal courts of appeals have “exclusive
jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity
of . . . all final orders of the Federal Communications Commission made reviewable by [the
Hobbs Act].” 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (2012).
117
Leckler v. Cashcall, Inc. (Leckler II), No. C 07-04002 SI, 2008 WL 5000528, at *1, *3
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2008).
118
See id. at *1 (noting that defendant “argued, for the first time,” that the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act only after filing a motion for
113
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backtracked on its substantive analysis of the 2008 Order; it merely
conceded lack of jurisdictional authority.119 Thus, one is left with the
impression that, but for the curious snag in TCPA jurisprudence that
is the Hobbs Act, the district courts would have long ago rejected the
FCC’s definition of prior express consent.120 Accordingly, the ultimate disposition of the Mais case is less important than how the
Eleventh Circuit reacts, if at all, to the lower court’s analysis of the
2008 Order.
A third and final criticism of Mais might be that the court should
have reached the second step of its Chevron analysis—whether the
FCC’s interpretation of prior express consent was “based on a permissible construction of the statute”—because Congress did not actually
speak directly on the issue:121 the TCPA never defines prior express
consent, suggesting that Congress intended the FCC to have discretion in crafting a definition in its implementing regulations.122 This
argument is partially undermined, however, by the fact that, when the
FCC changed its regulations implementing the TCPA in 2012, it continued to leave “prior express consent” undefined and instead added
a definition of “prior express written consent”123—a term that appears
nowhere in the TCPA. Prior express written consent should be selfevident: it is evidenced by a written agreement that confers permission
to call the signatory using an automatic telephone dialing system or
prerecorded message, executed prior to the making of any such

interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit on the issue of whether a consumer gave prior
express consent by providing a lender with his or her wireless number).
119
See id. at *2–3.
120
For example, after Leckler II was decided the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals defined “prior express consent” (as it appears in § 227(b)(1)(A)) as “[c]onsent that is clearly
and unmistakably stated,” albeit in a case not involving debt collection. See Satterfield v.
Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 955 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 323 (8th ed. 2004)). Strangely, the Ninth Circuit, in a later case that did involve debt
collection, adopted the FCC’s definition of prior express consent almost verbatim (without
reference to Satterfield), but then amended its opinion without comment, framing the
FCC’s definition of consent as follows: “[P]rior express consent is consent to call a particular telephone number in connection with a particular debt that is given before the call in
question is placed.” Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir.
2012) (emphasis added). Although the court cited to the 2008 Order, this is plainly not
the FCC’s standard but a heightened one requiring not only provision of a wireless number to a lender but also provision of express consent prior to the lender placing a specific
call regarding the debt. See id. This odd, hybrid definition of prior express consent is
simply sui generis and further highlights the difficulties posed by the FCC’s definition.
121
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
122
See id. at 843–44 (“If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is
an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation.”).
123
See 40 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(8) (2013).
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call.124 That the FCC felt compelled to define prior express written
consent but not prior express consent suggests that either Congress or
the FCC believed the definition of prior express consent to be apparent from the plain language of the statute. Nonetheless, leaving aside
the jurisdictional question, there is merit to the argument that the
Mais court should have reached the second prong of its Chevron analysis, and that, by not doing so, its analysis was incomplete. Therefore,
the question of whether the FCC’s interpretation represents a permissible construction of the statute will be addressed in Part III.C.125
Despite these potential criticisms of the Mais decision, if outcomes are at least as important as the means to achieve them, it is
worth considering whether, from a normative perspective, the court’s
essential point (as well as that of the Edeh and Thrasher-Lyon courts)
holds water. In other words, in light of plain meaning language usage
and everyday experience, was the court right when it suggested that
the FCC’s interpretation of prior express consent actually sounds a lot
more like prior implied consent?126 After all, the TCPA is, at its core, a
consumer protection statute; courts should therefore construe it in a
manner that is more favorable to consumers, rather than less
favorable.127 Despite serious doubt as to whether the Mais court could
so easily forgo adopting the 2008 Order as binding law—doubts that
will ultimately be resolved at the appellate level—the Mais court properly balked at what appears to be an abuse of discretion by the FCC.
B. Is the Analysis in Mais and Similar Cases Sufficiently
Compelling to Override the FCC’s Interpretation—
Or Are Such Cases Mere Outliers in TCPA
Jurisprudence?
This subpart discusses the normative arguments for and against
the FCC’s interpretation of prior express consent. It first reviews the
language of the 2008 Order, recent changes to the rules implementing the TCPA, and the basic goals underlying the passage of the
TCPA. It then argues that the TCPA represents a balancing of privacy
and commercial interests and that an analysis of the FCC’s interpretation of prior express consent must likewise take into consideration the
conflicting interests of creditors and debtors. It concludes by arguing
124
The regulations define prior express written consent as: “[A]n agreement, in writing,
bearing the signature of the person called that clearly authorizes the seller to deliver or cause
to be delivered to the person called advertisements or telemarketing messages using an
automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
125
See infra Part III.C.
126
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
127
Cf. Gager v. Dell Fin. Servs., LLC, 727 F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Because the
TCPA is a remedial statute, it should be construed to benefit consumers.”).
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that, so long as communications between debtors and creditors are
covered by section 227(b)(1)(A) of the TCPA, the compelling interests of creditors are not sufficient to override the reasonable protections that the TCPA offers to consumers.
Before placing an autodialed call or a call delivering a
prerecorded message to a wireless number, the caller must obtain the
called party’s prior express consent.128 According to the FCC’s 2008
Order, when a creditor places an autodialed or prerecorded message
call to a wireless number that was provided by the called party to the
creditor in connection with an existing debt, the call is made with the
“prior express consent” of the called party and therefore permissible
under the TCPA.129 An act independent from provision of the wireless number is not required because, according to the FCC, a person
who provides his or her wireless number has, in effect, given his or her
express consent to be called at that number using an autodialing system or prerecorded voice.130 In other words, a debtor does not have
to give express verbal or written permission to the creditor; the creditor may infer from provision of the wireless number that consent has
been given, “absent instructions to the contrary.”131 The FCC therefore allows consent to be inferred or implied even though the TCPA
clearly requires express consent.
Can consent that is inferred also be express consent? Black’s Law
Dictionary defines express consent as consent that is “directly given”:
“[i]t is positive, direct, unequivocal consent, requiring no inference or
implication to supply its meaning.”132 From at least one perspective,
then, the answer is clearly “no.” Also, consider the following
scenarios:
1. A man is out drinking with friends at a local bar. A woman
with whom he has been exchanging glances throughout the
night walks over to him, hands him a piece of paper, and says,
“Call me.” The woman’s wireless number is written on the
paper.
2. A corporate employee is drinking with business associates in
the bar of a hotel where an industry convention is being held.
A senior executive of a rival company walks over to the employee, hands her his business card, and says, “Your presentation today was really impressive. We could really use someone
with your talent on our team. Call me.” The executive’s wireless work number is written on his business card.
128
129
130
131
132

See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) (2012).
FCC, 2008 Order, supra note 13, at 559.
See id. at 564.
Id. (quoting FCC, 1992 Order, supra note 18, at 8769).
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (5th ed. 1979).
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In both situations, it is clear that the person providing his or her
wireless number has given consent for the recipient to place a call to
that number; the consent was express. But what sort of consent was
being given? In both situations, the meaning of the consent must be
inferred from the circumstances. The woman in the first scenario has
clearly invited the man at the bar to call her and ask her out; it is less
likely that she wants to engage in a business venture with him. The
executive in the second scenario appears to be suggesting that the
recipient-employee call to discuss taking on a position within the executive’s company; the inference that he is hoping for a romantic dinner is more difficult to make. In both cases, the called parties would
certainly be confused or even offended if the recipients of their wireless numbers upset their expectations by calling to sell magazine
subscriptions.
The definition of express consent provided by Black’s Law Dictionary and the conclusions drawn from these hypothetical scenarios suggests that, from a normative perspective, mere provision of one’s
wireless number to another cannot constitute express consent to be
called using an autodialing system, absent some other indication of
assent or circumstances which make such an inference inevitable.
Rather, it is clear on the face of the 2008 Order that what the FCC is
describing is implied or inferred consent: persons who provide their
wireless numbers “have in effect given their invitation or permission
to be called” using an autodialing system; consent “is deemed to be
granted” if a wireless number is provided to a creditor during a debt
transaction.133 Surely, the FCC cannot be accused of mere sloppy
drafting.
Instead, the questions that remain are why the FCC considers implied consent sufficient in the debt-collection context and why, in implementing a statute that clearly places the burden on callers to
acquire prior express consent, the FCC felt that debtors (the called
parties) should bear the burden of affirmatively revoking the consent
that their creditors are otherwise free to infer. To state it more succinctly, how is an interpretation of prior express consent that transforms the meaning of section 227(b)(1)(A) into something like the
following a permissible reading of the statute: “It shall not be unlawful
for any person to make a call to a wireless number using an autodialing system or to initiate a call featuring an artificial or prerecorded
133
See FCC, 2008 Order, supra note 13, at 564–65 (internal quotations omitted). That
callers can infer consent to contact recipients using an autodialing telephone system from
the mere provision of a wireless number also requires two leaps of inference: first, that the
person providing the number is aware of the creditor’s practice of using an autodialing
system; and, second, that the person providing the number is consenting to calls which use
that technology. Arguably, if a communication requires the piling of inference upon inference in order to be understood, it is not express (that is, clearly and unmistakably stated).
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voice, as long as the called party provided the caller with his or her
wireless number and did not say anything to the contrary”?
In 2012, the FCC revised its rules implementing the TCPA, citing
a need for consistency with Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
telemarketing rules and “substantial record support and evidence of
continued consumer frustration with unwanted telemarketing robocalls.”134 These revisions mainly accomplished two things: First, they
eliminated the prior business-relationship exception for autodialed or
prerecorded telemarketing calls to residential lines.135 Second,
autodialed or prerecorded telemarketing calls now require the prior
express written consent of the called party when made to residential
and wireless numbers.136 The requirement for non-telemarketing
calls made to wireless numbers (i.e., “prior express consent”) remains
unchanged.137
The FCC’s revisions not only create consistency with FTC rules.
By requiring express written consent for telemarketing calls to wireless
and residential numbers and by removing the prior businessrelationship exemption, the FCC has also made it more difficult for
telemarketers and telephone solicitors to reach consumers using
autodialing systems or prerecorded messages.138 And this change is
intentional.139 Although the FCC found it important to “strike an appropriate balance” between the interests of consumers and
telemarketers, the revisions are, at least on their face, about further
minimizing the adverse impact that unsolicited telemarketing calls
have on consumers’ privacy interests.140 FCC Commissioner Mignon
Clyburn, for example, put emphasis on the idea of choice: “By requiring prior written consent, consumers will be making an affirmative and
definitive choice, whether or not to receive telemarketing robocalls.”141
134

FCC, 2012 Report and Order, supra note 10, at 8 ¶ 18.
Id. at 2 ¶ 2.
136
Id. The revisions also make it easier for consumers to opt-out of autodialed
telemarketing calls once consent has been given. See id.
137
Id. at 9 ¶ 21 (declining to extend written consent requirement to nontelemarking
automatic calls). In fact, in response to comments from Portfolio Recovery Association, a
consumer debt purchasing company, which claimed that a written consent requirement
for automated calls made to wireless numbers would adversely affect debt collectors, the
FCC stated that “informational, non-telemarketing calls” do not require the prior express
written consent of the called party. Id. at 40 ¶ 11. The FCC suggested that such calls
require oral but not necessarily written consent. See id. at 12 ¶ 28. However, there is ambiguity in the order whether debt-collection calls are informational, or simply commercial
calls that do not deliver an unsolicited advertisement. See id.
138
See, e.g., id. at 18 ¶ 43 (“[E]limination of the EBR [(business-relationship exemption)] will require telemarketers to secure consent from consumers in some cases where
they would not have obtained consent under the current rules.”).
139
See id. at 2 ¶ 1 (“The protections we adopt will protect consumers from unwanted
autodialed or prerecorded telemarketing calls . . . .”).
140
Id. at 38 ¶ 5, 47.
141
Id. at 48 (alteration in original).
135
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This emphasis on choice suggests that the FCC’s revisions made the
TCPA’s consent requirements more, not less, stringent.
While the written-consent requirement applies only to
telemarketing calls, including calls made to wireless numbers, it comports with, and in some sense highlights, the logic of the entire statute: the TCPA is a consumer protection statute focused on consent.142
Therefore, although the heightened consent requirement introduced
by the 2012 revisions does not apply to autodialed or prerecorded
debt-collection calls made to wireless numbers, the underlying sentiment—that consumers have a choice, should be asked for their affirmative and express consent, and should be able to change their
minds in the future—should still apply so long as the TCPA remains
applicable to such calls.143 The FCC has stated unequivocally that
debt-collections calls are not completely exempt from the TCPA.144
As such, there is no compelling reason why debtors should not receive
the same substantive (if not procedural) rights under the TCPA as
other consumers who are not receiving debt-collection calls.145
As noted in Part I, the TCPA has two underlying goals: the protection of consumer privacy and the reduction of nuisance and threats to
consumer health and safety.146 In achieving these goals, the TCPA
does not absolutely proscribe automated calls or prerecorded
messages, as if they were toxic substances; it merely establishes parameters for parties who wish to make such calls. By doing so, the TCPA
strikes a balance between individual privacy interests and commercial
interests.147 Accordingly, in looking at debt-collection calls covered by
the TCPA, it is important to question whether regulating such calls is
antithetical to the goals of the TCPA or elicits the same need to strike
a balance between conflicting interests.

142
See id. at 46 (“For decades, Congress and the Commission have recognized that
consumers should have control over the telemarketing calls that come to their homes and
mobile devices, and be able to stop the ones that they don’t want to receive.”).
143
Cf. Waller et al., supra note 3, at 53 (“The TCPA is more than just telemarketing
regulation, it is an important consumer protection statute.”).
144
See FCC, 2008 Order, supra note 13, at 565 ¶ 11.
145
But see Colin Hector, Debt Collection in the Information Age: New Technologies and the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1601, 1630–32 (2011) (noting that heightened consent requirements for calls to debtors may impose unnecessary costs on creditors
and perhaps make debtors “practically unreachable by phone”).
146
See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
147
See Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2 ¶ 9, 105
Stat. 2394 (1991) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012)) (requiring a balancing of privacy
interests with “commercial freedoms of speech and trade”); Lusskin v. Seminole Comedy,
Inc., No. 12-62173-Civ-SCOLA, 2013 WL 3147339, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 19, 2013) (“The
purpose of the TCPA was to strike a balance between protecting the privacy of individuals
while still permitting legitimate telemarketing practices.”).

R
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On the one hand, Congress likely did not have debt-collection
calls specifically in mind when it enacted the TCPA.148 In addition,
there are policy arguments to be made in favor of allowing a lower
threshold for consent in the debt-collection context. First, the argument that autodialed debt-collection calls to bona fide debtors constitute a threat to public welfare or safety is generally a weak one.149
Second, society has an interest in ensuring that creditors or third
party collectors are able to collect debts to which they are legally entitled, an interest that outweighs the interests of debtors in avoiding
unwanted autodialed calls.150 Third, the privacy interests of debtors
are not as compelling as the privacy interests of nondebtors—who are
merely trying to avoid unwanted telephone solicitations—because
debtors have legal obligations that they should not be able to avoid
merely by invoking their right to privacy. Lastly, debtors are protected
against abusive debt-collection practices by other laws, such as the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act,151 which are more narrowly tailored to
the debt-collection context.
On the other hand, Congress was not completely unaware of the
effect the TCPA would have on debt-collection practices. For example, a Senate report that accompanied the TCPA states the following:
Some telemarketers asked that [the TCPA] be amended to exempt
. . . automated calls made for debt collection purposes . . . . [This]
exemption[ ] [is] not included in the bill, as reported. The Committee [on Commerce, Science, and Transportation] believes that
such automated calls only should be permitted if the called party
gives his or her consent to the use of these machines.152

While such a report is only one piece of evidence that Congress clearly
intended to empower debtors with the ability to give prior express
consent—and note how the report calls specifically for consent “to the
use of these [automatic telephone dialing] machines,”153 not just
generalized consent—it nonetheless fully comports with the plain
language of section 227(b)(1)(A).154 Thus, despite the counterarguments listed above—or even notwithstanding such arguments—
Congress likely intended to protect all called parties from unwanted
148

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
For example, such calls should not ordinarily block access to an emergency or hospital line.
150
Cf. Hector, supra note 145, at 1630–32 (noting that heightened consent requirements for calls to debtors may impose unjustified burdens on debt collectors).
151
See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors . . . and to promote consistent State action
to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.”).
152
S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 3–4 (1991).
153
Id.
154
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) (2012) (requiring that consent be given to use “any
automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice”).

R
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autodialed calls to which they had not previously consented. If so,
then Congress should decide whether to loosen the restrictions on
calls made to one class of persons or another, not the FCC, unless the
TCPA includes a specific grant of discretion to the FCC.
C. Did Congress Grant the FCC Discretion to Determine
What Constitutes Prior Express Consent, and, if so,
Is the FCC’s Interpretation Reasonable?
Does the FCC have discretion to determine what constitutes prior
express consent? As a threshold matter, the FCC is granted significant
discretion by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2).155 However, with respect to calls
made to wireless numbers, the FCC is expressly authorized to carve
out an exemption only for calls made to wireless numbers “that are
not charged to the called party . . . .”156 This carveout provision has
allowed the FCC to create an exemption for common carriers that
wish to contact their subscribers about, for example, the delivery of
customer services or new products, without receiving prior express
consent.157 The FCC has not used it to create a blanket exemption for
calls that, incidentally, are not charged to the called party because
callers generally have no way of telling whether a wireless subscriber
will be charged for the call.158 By comparison, the FCC has authority
to exempt calls to residential lines when those calls are not made for a
commercial purpose or when those calls are commercial in nature but
do not adversely affect the privacy rights that the TCPA is intended to
protect.159 Accordingly, the FCC lacks statutory authority to create an
actual implied consent exemption for autodialed calls to wireless
numbers, even if the FCC finds that such calls would not adversely
affect the privacy interests of debtors.
Even if the TCPA does not expressly grant the FCC authority to
create a debt-collection exemption, it is arguably still entitled to craft
a definition of prior express consent that would achieve the same
ends—provided that its definition of prior express consent was a permissible construction of the statute. As noted supra, the Mais court
155
See also Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2 ¶ 13, 105 Stat. 2394 (1991) (congressional findings) (codified at 47 U.S.C § 227 (2012)) (“[T]he [FCC] should have the flexibility to
design different rules for those types of automated or prerecorded calls that it finds are not
considered a nuisance or invasion of privacy.”). While this might seem like a justification
for expanding the FCC’s discretion in crafting exemptions, a legislative finding simply does
not have the same force of law as plain statutory text, and it should be presumed that such
findings were incorporated into the drafting process and are therefore already reflected in
the text of the statute.
156
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(C).
157
See FCC, 2012 Report and Order, supra note 10, at 11–12 ¶ 27.
158
See FCC, 2008 Order, supra note 13, at 562 n.22 (“[C]allers have no way to determine how consumers are charged for their wireless service.”).
159
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(B)(i), (ii)(I).
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believed that Congress had settled the matter and that the statute was
clear on its face.160 However, it is more likely that, while Congress
understood that express consent is largely self-evident (i.e., it is not
implied consent), Congress wanted to give the FCC some discretion to
dictate how telemarketers could obtain prior express consent—for example, verbally or in writing.161 Therefore, it left the FCC free to
write its own definition of prior express consent, not so the FCC could
change the requirement of section 227(b)(1)(A) from express to implied consent, but so the FCC could clarify the form of that consent.162
Of course, the fact that the FCC did not define prior express consent
when it first implemented the TCPA suggests that the FCC itself believed the meaning of “prior express consent” to be self-evident or at
least complicates the argument that the statute is so ambiguous as to
conclusively prove that Congress meant to leave it to the FCC to define prior express consent. At the same time, however, the intent of
Congress is not unmistakably clear on the face of the statute, as the
Mais court argued.
Under Chevron, if a statute is ambiguous with respect to a specific
issue or if the intent of Congress is unclear, then the answer provided
by the agency charged with implementing the statute is entitled to
judicial deference so long as it is based on a permissible construction
of the statute.163 The agency’s construction does not have to be the
one a reviewing court would have chosen; it merely must be a reasonable one.164 Because the TCPA is arguably ambiguous as to what constitutes prior express consent, the remaining question is therefore
whether the FCC’s interpretation is a permissible construction of the
statute, i.e., whether it is reasonable.165 As I have argued in this Note,
the FCC’s interpretation of prior express consent is not a permissible
construction of section 227(b)(1)(A) because it allows a creditor to
circumvent that section’s requirement of express consent altogether
and to escape liability for prohibited calls by alleging that consent
could be inferred from the mere provision of a consumer’s wireless
160
See supra note 58 and accompanying text; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).
161
Cf. FCC, GroupMe Ruling, supra note 25, ¶ 8 (“Because the TCPA is silent on how
consumer consent should be obtained, we exercise our discretion to interpret the requirement by looking to the consumer protection policies and goals underlying the TCPA.”).
162
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
163
Id. at 844.
164
Id.
165
See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text. Reasonable can mean “represent[ing] a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to
the agency’s care by the statute,” not merely reasonable as a matter of “plain English”
language usage. See United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961).
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number.166 In addition, the 2008 Order undermines Congress’s intent to regulate a specific category of calls—autodialed calls or calls
delivering a prerecorded message—because it does not require that a
creditor prove that the called party actually consented, either expressly or impliedly, to calls made using those technologies.167
CONCLUSION: WHY

FCC SHOULD CHANGE ITS APPROACH
PRIOR EXPRESS CONSENT

THE

TO

The TCPA requires prior express consent for autodialed calls
made to cellular telephone numbers, regardless of the content of the
call.168 The TCPA, however, does not define prior express consent.169
Exercising its discretionary authority, the FCC has provided an interpretation of prior express consent that applies in the debt-collection
context.170 Federal district courts have generally treated this interpretation with deference because of the jurisdictional constraints of the
Hobbs Act; others have considered the merits of the FCC’s approach
and rejected it on the grounds that it creates an implied consent exemption to section 227(b)(1)(A) that the FCC has no statutory authority to create.171 When the FCC revised its rules implementing the
TCPA in 2012, it added an express written consent requirement for
certain calls, not including debt-collection calls.172 It did not add a
definition of prior express consent to the regulations themselves, perhaps because it is unclear what that definition would look like in light
of its interpretation,173 but the 2008 Order functions effectively as an
alternative, binding law because the district courts are bound to apply
it. As a result, there is currently a range of benchmarks for consent
under the TCPA.
In enacting the TCPA, Congress established a regulatory “floor”
for consent to autodialed calls and calls delivering a prerecorded message: when made to wireless numbers, such calls require the prior express consent of the called party.174 Prior implied consent would fall
below that regulatory floor and therefore not meet the requirements
of the statute because, given the nature of the TCPA as a consumer
166

See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.B.
168
See supra note 16 and accompanying text. With the exception of calls made for
emergency purposes. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) (2012).
169
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
170
See supra notes 21–20 and accompanying text.
171
See supra Part II.
172
See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
173
One can perhaps imagine what it would look like: “Prior express consent is consent
that is inferred from the provision of a consumer’s wireless number to a vendor or creditor
during a commercial transaction or a transaction giving rise to a creditor-debtor
relationship.”
174
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) (2012).
167
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protection statute, acting on implied consent would increase the risk
that the consumer’s choice to receive or not receive such calls was not
being honored.175 This is true even if the inference of consent were
unavoidable; the statute clearly requires express consent.176 However,
the statute does not define prior express consent and thus it is possible that such consent could take different forms—for example, written or verbal.177 The degree to which the form of consent required by
the FCC remains above the TCPA’s regulatory floor would depend
upon whether one could reasonably construe the consent as express;
if no person could reasonably construe such consent as express, it
would not satisfy the requirements of section 227 (b)(1)(A). Because
the statute is relatively unambiguous, the range of reasonableness
should be relatively narrow.178
By allowing for implied consent in the debt-collection context,
the FCC has impermissibly lowered the threshold for consent and
frustrated the intent of Congress by failing to distinguish between generalized and specific consent.179 Arguably, the FCC’s approach makes
debtors easier to reach and therefore respects the strong interests of
creditors in reducing the cost of recovering capital.180 But the TCPA
was not enacted for the benefit of debt collectors.181 As such, this
does not serve as a compelling justification for the FCC’s current interpretation of prior express consent. On the other hand, there are
several good reasons why the FCC should revise its approach.
First, the FCC is clearly capable of distinguishing between generalized consent and consent to receive a more specific type of call. For
example, in its 2012 Report and Order, the FCC rejected the argument that a consumer who provides his or her wireless number to a
vendor expects to receive marketing and service calls if the wireless
number was only provided “as a point of contact.”182 Thus, the FCC
175

See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
177
See 47 U.S.C. § 227; supra note 18 and text accompanying note 161.
178
Compare City of Arlington v. FCC, No. 11-1545, slip op. at 16 (5th Cir. May 20, 2013)
(“Where Congress has established a clear line, the agency cannot go beyond it; and where
Congress has established an ambiguous line, the agency can go no further than the ambiguity will fairly allow.”), with Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843 n.11 (1984) (“The court need not conclude that the agency construction was
the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the
reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial
proceeding.”).
179
See supra notes 8–9 and Part III.C.
180
See Hector, supra note 142, at 1630–32.
181
See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
182
FCC, 2012 Report and Order, supra note 10, at 11 ¶ 25 (“Consumers who provide a
wireless phone number for a limited purpose—for service calls only—do not necessarily
expect to receive telemarketing calls that go beyond the limited purpose for which oral
consent regarding service calls may have been granted.”).
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cannot argue that distinguishing between generalized and specific
consent is difficult for the purpose of rulemaking. In addition, the
FCC has itself argued that giving out one’s contact information does
not necessarily establish consent: in 1995, the FCC stated, “We do not
believe that the intent of the TCPA is to equate mere distribution or
publication of a telephone facsimile number with prior express permission or invitation to receive . . . advertisements.”183 Accordingly,
the FCC would not have to “reinvent the wheel” to revise its interpretation; it would simply have to look to its prior practice.
Second, the FCC has already shown itself capable of responding
to criticism among jurists that its rules implementing the TCPA run
counter to the plain language of the statute. Prior to passage of the
Junk Fax Protection Act in 2005, there was considerable confusion
among state courts over an FCC ruling that allowed consent to receive
unsolicited facsimile (fax) advertisements to be inferred from an established business relationship.184 At the time, unsolicited fax advertisements were prohibited by section 227(b)(1)(C) of the TCPA, and
there was no prior business-relationship exception written into the
statute;185 there was, however, an established business relationship exception for unsolicited telephone solicitations, and the FCC argued that
the TCPA should be construed to carry over the exception for telephone solicitations into the section dealing with fax solicitations.186
Subsequently, numerous state courts, faced with lawsuits arising from
unsolicited fax advertisements, rejected the FCC’s interpretation of
the TCPA as “at odds with the plain language of the statute.”187
More specifically, these courts focused on the fact that, while section
227(b)(2)(C) required the recipient’s prior express consent to receive
a fax advertisement, the FCC’s rule allowed for consent to be implied
from prior business dealings.188
183
FCC, 1995 Opinion and Order, supra note 12, at 12408 ¶ 37. The FCC stated that a
prior business relationship would suffice to establish consent to facsimile communication.
See id. Arguably, the FCC’s definition of consent in the debt-collection context also relies
on this notion of a business relationship between debtor and creditor. However, it is worth
remembering that there is no prior business-relationship exemption to section
227(b)(1)(A). See 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012).
184
See Weitzner v. Iridex Corp., No 05 CV 1254(RJD), 2006 WL 1851441, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2006) (“Numerous state courts examining the [TCPA] and its legislative
history questioned whether the FCC’s interpretation, applying the established business relationship exemption to facsimiles, was supported by the statute.”); FCC, 1992 Order, supra
note 18, at 8779 n.87 (“We note, however, that facsimile transmission from persons or
entities who have an established business relationship with the recipient can be deemed to be
invited or permitted by the recipient.” (emphasis added)).
185
See, Weitzner, 2006 WL 1851441, at *3 (noting that there was a “provision prohibiting unsolicited facsimile advertisements”).
186
See id.
187
Id. at *4 (citing numerous state court cases).
188
See. id. (“[T]he FCC’s interpretation of the [established business relationship] defense would act to amend the TCPA’s definition of unsolicited advertisement from a fax
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In response to this criticism, the FCC decided to revise its rules so
that a showing of a prior business relationship would no longer be
sufficient for proving consent.189 However, Congress stepped in and
passed the Junk Fax Prevention Act, which wrote the established business exception into section 227(b)(1)(C).190 Legislative intervention
settled the argument between courts and the FCC, but, as one court
pointed out, it did not necessarily affirm the FCC’s original position.191 Rather, the FCC’s revisions highlighted the fact that the FCC
had perhaps lacked statutory authority to promulgate its rule.192 Likewise, the FCC’s interpretation of prior express consent in the debtcollection context lacks support in the plain language of the TCPA,
and the FCC should revise it because failing to do so will only lead to
more confusion among the courts. If the FCC’s interpretation really
does comport with Congress’s intent, then Congress remains free to
revise the TCPA instead.
Third, the FCC should change its approach to prior express consent because doing so would make the FCC’s rules consistent with the
FTC’s thinking on debt-collection calls to wireless numbers. In a 2009
workshop report on consumer debt, the FTC supported the idea that
creditors should be allowed to contact consumers on their mobile
phones, but only with consumers’ prior express consent.193 The
report went on to state that such consent should be found only where
“(1) the consumers have been adequately informed that they may receive collection calls on their mobile phones; and (2) the consumers
have taken some affirmative step to indicate their agreement to receive such calls.”194 Although the FTC report may suffer the same
flaw of failing to distinguish between general and specific consent, its
standard does “provide[ ] greater protection for consumers” by requiring adequate notification and some “affirmative step to indicate . . . agreement,” not merely provision of a wireless number.195
Given that the FCC cited the need for conformity with FTC rules in its
sent without the recipient’s prior express invitation or permission, to a fax sent without the
recipient’s prior express or implied invitation or permission. That interpretation conflicts
with the plain language of the statute.” (quoting Kondos v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 2001 TCPA
Rep. 1036, at *4 (Tex. Dist. Ct. July 12, 2001) (unpublished)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
189
See id. at *6.
190
Pub. L. No. 109-21, 119 Stat. 359 (2005) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(b)(1)(c) (2012)).
191
See Weitzner, 2006 WL 1851441, at *8.
192
See id. (“More telling, perhaps, is the FCC’s own uncertainty as to its authority to
promulgate this exemption, as evidenced by its reversal of gears and its proposed elimination of the rule after ten years . . . .”).
193
See FTC, COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBT: THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE 41–42 (2009),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/debtcollection/dcwr.pdf.
194
Id. at 42.
195
Id. at 42 & n.266.
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2012 Report and Order (outlining revisions to 47 C.F.R. part
64.1200),196 changing its standard for prior express consent to require
notification and some affirmative, express indication of consent by
consumers would further this goal of uniformity.
Finally, the FCC should revise its approach because the federal
district courts are without jurisdictional authority to set aside the 2008
Order.197 Without that authority, they must treat the 2008 Order as
binding law and are without liberty to consider the merits of a plaintiff’s claim that he or she was never given an affirmative and definitive
choice whether to receive autodialed calls or calls delivering a
prerecorded message, a right to which all called parties are entitled
under the TCPA.198 The federal courts of appeals, which do have authority to determine the validity of the 2008 Order, may eventually
come to conflicting conclusions about its validity, setting up a possible
appeal to the Supreme Court.199 But the FCC has all the tools it
needs to make a change now: an authorizing statute, cogent judicial
reasoning to guide its hand, and, hopefully, this Note to provide a
clarion call. The only question is: Will the FCC pick up the phone?

196

See FCC, 2012 Report and Order, supra note 10, at 2 ¶ 2.
See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
198
FCC, 2012 Report and Order, supra note 10, at 48 (statement of Commissioner
Clyburn); see supra notes 41–43, 145 and accompanying text.
199
See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text.
197
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